Abstract-We consider a continuous-time version of fictitious play (FP), in which interacting players evolve their strategies in reaction to their opponents' actions without knowledge of their opponents' utilities. It is known that FP need not converge, but that convergence is possible in certain special cases including zero-sum games, identical interest games, and two-player/two-move games. We provide a unified proof of convergence in all of these cases by showing that a Lyapunov function previously introduced for zero-sum games also can establish stability in the other special cases. We go on to consider a two-player game in which only one player has two-moves and use properties of planar dynamical systems to establish convergence.
FP, game players repeatedly use strategies that are best responses to the historical averages, or empirical frequencies, of opponents. These empirical frequencies and, hence, player strategies may or may not converge. The important implication of convergence of empirical frequencies is that it implies a convergence to a Nash equilibrium.
There is a substantial body of literature on FP [9] . A selected timeline of results that establish convergence for special cases of games is as follows: 1951, two player zero-sum games [18] ; 1961, two player two move games [16] ; 1993, noisy two player two move games with a unique Nash equilibrium [8] ; 1996, multiplayer games with identical player utilities [17] ; 1999, noisy two-player/two-move games with countable Nash equilibria [2] ; and two player games in which one player has only two moves [3] . A convergence counterexample due to Shapley in 1964 has two players with three moves each [20] . A 1993 counterexample due to Jordan has three players with two moves each [12] . Nonconvergence issues are also discussed in [6] , [7] , [10] , [13] , and [21] .
In this note, we consider a continuous-time form of FP and provide a unified proof of convergence of empirical frequencies for the special cases of zero-sum games, identical interest games, and twoplayer/two-move games. The proofs are unified in the sense that they all employ an energy function that has the natural interpretation as an "opportunity for improvement." This energy function was used as a Lyapunov function in [11] for zero-sum games. We show that the same energy function can establish convergence for all of the above cases, in some cases by a Lyapunov argument and in other cases by an integrability argument.
We go on to consider games in which one of two players has only two moves. We provide an alternative proof that exploits some simple properties of planar dynamical systems.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section II sets up the problem of continuous time FP. Section III contains convergence proofs for zero-sum, identical interest, and two-player/two-move games. Section IV discusses games in which one of two players has only two moves. Finally, Section V has some concluding remarks. Notation
• For i 2 f1; 2; ...;ng, 0i denotes the complementary set f1; ...;i 0 1;i + 1; ...;ng.
• Boldface 1 denotes the vector
1
. . .
of appropriate dimension.
• 1(n) denotes the simplex in R n , i.e., s 2 R n js 0 componentwise, and 1 T s = 1
• Int(1(n)) denotes the set of interior points of a simplex, i.e., s > 0 componentwise.
• v i 2 1(n) denotes the ith vertex of the simplex 1(n),
i.e., the vector whose ith term equals 1 and remaining terms equal 0.
• H : Int(1(n)) ! R denotes the entropy function H(s) = 0s T log(s)
• : R n ! Int(1(n)) denotes the "logit" or "soft-max" function ((x)) i = 
where diag((x)) denotes the diagonal square matrix with elements taken from (x).
II. FICTITIOUS PLAY SETUP

A. Static Game
We consider a two player game with players P1 and P2, each with positive integer dimensions m 1 and m 2 , respectively. Each player, P i , selects a strategy, p i 2 1(m i ), and receives a real-valued reward according to the utility function Ui(pi;p0i). (1) i.e., each player has no incentive to deviate from an equilibrium strategy provided that the other player maintains an equilibrium strategy. In terms of the best response mappings, a Nash equilibrium is any pair 
In discrete-time FP, the strategy of player Pi at time k is the optimal response to the running average of the opponent's actions, i.e., p i (k) = i (q 0i (k)): The case where = 0 corresponds to classical FP. Setting positive rewards randomization, thereby imposing in so-called mixed strategies. As approaches zero, the best response mappings approximate selecting the maximal element since the probability of selecting a maximal element approaches one when the maximal element is unique. The game with positive then can be viewed as a smoothed version of the matrix game [8] in which rewards are subject to random perturbations.
C. Continuous-Time Fictitous Play
Now, consider the continuous-time dynamics
We will call these equations continuous-time FP. These are the dynamics obtained by viewing discrete-time FP as stochastic approximation iterations and applying associated ordinary differential equation (ODE) analysis methods [1] , [14] .
III. CONVERGENCE PROOFS FOR ZERO-SUM, IDENTICAL INTEREST, AND TWO-MOVE GAMES
We will derive a unified framework which establishes convergence of (2) to a Nash equilibrium of the static game (1) in the aforementioned special cases of zero-sum, identical interest, and two-move games.
Zero-sum and identical interest here refer to the portion of the utility other than the weighted entropy. In other words, zero-sum means that for all p 1 and p 2
and identical interest means that
Strictly speaking, the inclusion of the entropy term does not result in a zero-sum or identical interest game, but we will use these terms nonetheless. These functions were used in [11] for zero-sum games, i.e., M1 = 0M T 2 , through a Lyapunov argument using V1 + V2 to show that the continuous-time empirical frequencies converge to a Nash equilibrium.
We will show that the same functions can be used to establish convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the case of identical interest games and in the case of two-move games. The identical interest case will not be a Lyapunov argument. Rather, we will show that the sum, V1 + V2, is integrable. For two-move games, we will show that an appropriately scaled sum, 1 V 1 + 2 V 2 , is either a Lyapunov function or is integrable.
The following lemma reveals a special structure for the derivatives of the V i along trajectories of continuous-time FP (2) .
along solutions of continuous-time FP (2) . Then
The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 [4, Lemma 3.3.1]:
Let F (x; u) be a continuously differentiable function of x 2 R n and u 2 R m . Let U be a convex subset of R m . Assume that 3 (x) is a continuously differentiable function such that for all x 3 (x) = arg max u2U F (x; u):
Then r x ( max u2U F (x; u) ) = r x F (x; 3 (x)):
Proof: (Lemma 3.1) By definition
where we used Lemma 3.2 to show that
The lemma follows by noting that concavity of H (1) Proof: Define
V12(t) =Ṽ1(t) +Ṽ2(t):
Zero-sum (see also [11] with equality only at an equilibrium point of (2), the theorem follows from standard Lyapunov arguments.
By concavity of H(1) and [19, Th. 25 
which implies that for any T > 0
The integrand is positive, and T > 0 is arbitrary. Furthermore, one can
show that _ V12 is bounded. Therefore, V12(t) asymptotically approaches zero as desired. We comment that the integrability argument previously mentioned can be viewed a version of the discrete-time argument in [17] , but applied to a smoothed game (i.e., > 0) in continuous-time.
B. Two-Move Games
We now consider the case in which each player in the original static game has two moves, i.e., m1 = m2 = 2.
Continuous-time FP dynamics (2) involve differences of probability distributions. Since these distributions live on the simplex, their elements sum to one. Therefore, the sum of the elements of the difference of two distributions must equal zero, i.e., differences of distributions must lie in the subspace spanned by the vector
Using this fact, we see that necessarily _ q1(t) = 1(q2(t)) 0 q1(t) = Nw1(t)
for an appropriately defined scalar variable w 1 (t). Similarly _ q2(t) = Nw2(t):
This observation will be the key to proving the desired results in the two-move game. Two separate cases will emerge In the first case, the proof will follow the same Lyapunov argument of the zero-sum proof. In the second case, the proof will follow the integrability argument of the identical interest proof. [17] suggests a link between the proofs for zero-sum, identical interest, and two-player two-move games. Namely, it states that nondegenerate two-player two-move games are best-response equivalent in mixed-strategies to an appropriate zero-sum or identical interest game, and since FP relies on best responses, this equivalence establishes convergence. The present approach does not utilize this equivalence, but does exploit the present zero-sum and identical interest proofs by establishing a direct link in terms of the constructed storage functions V i . which again leads to the desired result.
IV. TWO PLAYER GAMES WITH ONE PLAYER RESTRICTED TO TWO MOVES
SectionIII used energy arguments, either Lyapunov or integrability, with the same energy functions that represent the "opportunity for improvement." Reference [2] uses properties of planar dynamical systems to establish convergence for two-player/two-move games. Reference [3] considers games in which only one of the players has two moves, and uses a relatively extended argument to establish convergence by eliminating the possibility of so-called Shapley polygons. In this section, we also consider games in which only one player has two moves, but we will apply properties of planar dynamical systems to provide an alternative proof.
Suppose that player P 1 has only two moves, i.e., m 1 = 2. Following [3] , we will introduce a change of variables that will lead to planar dynamics that describe the evolution of the player P1's strategy. Define Since q 1 evolves in the simplex interior, the scalar w 1 (t) is uniquely defined by q1(t) = 1 2 1 2 + Nw1(t):
The result of introducing w1 and w2 is that a subset of the continuous FP dynamics can be expressed completely in terms of w 1 and w 2 , (q1(t) 0 1(q2(t))) = 0 lim t!1 (q 2 (t) 0 2 (q 1 (t))) = 0:
Proof: Equation (5) is planar dynamics that describe the evolution of q 1 (t). These dynamics form area contracting flow, due to the negative divergence of the right-hand-side. Furthermore, solutions evolve over a bounded rectangular set. A suitable modification of Bendixson's criterion [15] leads to the conclusion that the only !-limit points are equilibria. In the original coordinates, this implies that q 1 (t) converges, and hence so does q2(t).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This note has provided unified energy based convergence proofs for several special cases of games under FP. These proofs of convergence of continuous-time FP, in themselves, do not immediately guarantee the almost sure convergence of discrete-time FP. Additional arguments are needed to establish that the deterministic continuous-time limits completely capture the stochastic discrete-time limits. Such issues are discussed in general in [1] and specifically for FP in [2] .
I. INTRODUCTION
When performing system identification via the widely used prediction-error method with a quadratic criterion [1] , [2] , then a seminal result is that under open-loop conditions the noise-induced error, as measured by the variability of the ensuing frequency response estimate G e j! ; n N , may be quantified via the following approximation [1] , [3] [4] [5] :
Here, 8 and 8 u are, respectively, the measurement noise and input excitation power spectral densities, and n N is the prediction error estimate based on N observed data points of a vector A fundamental aspect of the approximation (1) is that it is derived by taking the limiting value of the variance as model order m tends to infinity, and then employing that limiting value as an approximation for finite m.
Motivated by the desire to improve the accuracy of variance error quantifications, [6] and [7] have derived new expressions that are exact for finite model order (although they are still based on limiting arguments with respect to observed data length N ).
As discussed in [6] , there can be very large discrepancies between the new quantifications derived for finite-model order [6] , and the approximation (1); [6] illustrates orders of magnitude difference on a simple example.
A key purpose of this note is to address this issue and provide a rapprochement between the results. The approach taken here is to derive new quantifications that are exact for finite model order. Although finite, this order may also be arbitrarily large, provided an appropriate regularised criterion is used to ensure that at the arbitrarily large model order, the limiting (in N ) estimate is uniquely defined.
Essentially, via this strategy, the work here establishes that when the regularising point (in parameter space) implies that any pole zero cancellations in the estimated model are constrained to be at the origin, then as model order m increases, the "exact"(for finite-model order) variance expression becomes arbitrarily close to the well known approximation (1). However, when the pole zero cancellations are not at the origin, the rapprochement is lost. This fact exposes the further new result that variance error (in the frequency domain) is dependent on the point about which regularization is imposed.
As overview of the organization of this note, Section II makes concrete the estimation algorithms and model structures being considered. Certain key ideas, notation and definitions are also introduced. Section III presents the main technical results, which are new variance error quantifications that are novel in that they do not depend on asymptotic in model order arguments, yet they still apply for model orders possibly greater than that of an underlying true system. Section IV discusses the ramifications and practical consequences of these results and, in particular, uses them to argue a rapprochement between new finite model order expressions [6] and pre-existing asymptotic model order approximations [3] . Section V provides concluding remarks and comments about prospective future studies.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In what follows, it is assumed that the relationship between an observed input data record fu t g and output data record fy t g obeys S : y t = G(q)u t + t t = H(q)e t (2) and that this is modeled according to 
while fetg in (3) is a zero-mean white noise sequence that satisfies E e 2 t = 2 , E je t j 8 < 1.
The postulated relationship (3) can encompass a range of model structures such as FIR, ARMAX, "Output-Error," and "Box-Jenkins" [1] , [2] , [8] . For all these cases, since H(q; n ) is also constrained to be 0018-9286/04$20.00 © 2004 IEEE
